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  1Abstract 
This article explores the EU’s efforts to ‘globalize’ EU environmental regulation.  EU 
leadership on global environmental governance emerged as the result of the combined 
effects of domestic politics and international regulatory competition. The growing 
power of environmental interests in Europe from the late 1980s, coupled with 
dynamics of EU policy-making led the EU to be committed to ambitious 
environmental policies. Given this commitment, it was in the international 
competitive interests of the EU to support international agreements that would 
pressure other jurisdictions to adopt similar environmental regulations. Promoting 
treaties that spread EU environmental norms internationally also served to legitimize 
EU rules and to shield them against legal challenges before world trade bodies.   
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During the past two decades the European Union (EU) has emerged as the global 
leader in international environmental politics.  On issues ranging from climate 
change, to biodiversity, to trade in toxic wastes, to the regulation of persistent organic 
pollutants, the EU has taken on a leadership role in promoting multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).  The EU has also led efforts to ‘green’ 
international trade institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
  Neither the EU itself nor its member states have always been leaders on 
international environmental policy.  When environmental issues emerged on the 
international scene in the early 1970s, the US took on a leadership role in preparations 
for the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment and 
championed treaties such as the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES).  The US demonstrated leadership again in the mid-
1980s, acting as the driving force behind the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances.  The precursor to the EU, the European Economic Community 
(EEC), was not a significant actor in international environmental policy at the time.  
The member states of the EEC eventually went along with the international treaties 
created in this period, but in a number of cases, such as the 1979 Convention on 
Transboundary Air Pollution and the Montreal Protocol, many did so only reluctantly. 
In the last two decades, however, the EU has emerged as the undisputed leader 
in international environmental politics. EU leadership is not simply the result of 
laggard behaviour by the US or other states. Certainly, the US shift from global 
environmental leader in the 1970s and 1980s to laggard and obstructionist in the 
1990s and 2000s opened an opportunity for the EU to assert leadership (Kelemen and 
  3Vogel, forthcoming; Sbragia and Damro 1999), but the retreat of the US did not force 
the EU to take on the active leadership role that it has. 
This article examines why the EU has taken on this leadership role in 
international environmental politics.  EU leadership in international environmental 
politics is best explained by a model of ‘regulatory politics’ (Kelemen and Vogel 
forthcoming, Raustiala 1997, Desombre 2000) that combines the effects of domestic 
politics and international regulatory competition.  Domestic
1 political forces have led 
EU member states and the EU itself to be committed to stringent environmental 
policies.  Given the EU’s commitment to high standards and the exposure of 
European firms to international competition, it is in the competitive interests of the 
EU to support international agreements that will pressure other states to adopt 
similarly costly regulations.  Moreover, the passage of international environmental 
agreements can legitimize existing EU rules and thus shield the EU against legal 
challenges before world trade bodies.   
EU leadership in international environmental politics provides striking 
examples of two of the strategies that Jacoby and Meunier (this volume) highlight as 
central to the EU’s efforts to manage globalization: exercising regulatory influence 
and empowering international institutions. Globalization generates, or at least is 
commonly perceived as generating, two primary threats to environmental policy in 
Europe.  First, trade liberalization, it is argued, will pressure EU member states to 
‘race-to-the-bottom’, lowering their standards toward the lowest common 
denominator in order to maintain competitiveness.  The second perceived threat stems 
from the international institutions charged with promoting economic liberalization, 
above all the WTO.  The logic here is that where EU member states resist race-to-the-
bottom pressures and maintain stringent environmental standards, these may be struck 
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or imagined, they have triggered a reaction from European policy-makers.  Policy-
makers have not treated these globalization pressures as inexorable forces that will 
determine their policies.  Rather, they have sought to manage globalization by 
spreading EU environmental standards around the world, through support of MEAs 
and through the EU’s normative and market power.  
  The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections.  The first details my 
‘regulatory politics’ explanation for EU environmental leadership and discusses 
alternative explanations.  The second provides empirical support for the regulatory 
politics explanation, offering a brief account of the domestic political developments 
that have led to strong demand for strict environmental policies and show how these 
demands, coupled with concerns over regulatory competition, stimulated EU 
leadership on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), climate change and the 
‘greening’ of the world trade regime. The third section concludes. 
 
I. Explaining EU global environmental leadership 
Some environmental issues, such as climate change, are inherently global and 
addressing them will require international cooperation.  Therefore, any state 
committed to solving these issues will be inclined to support cooperative, 
international efforts designed to address them.  However, we can not explain the 
intensity and the scope of the EU’s global environmental leadership solely on 
functional grounds.  Global problems may require cooperative solutions, but this does 
not tell us why the EU has been the chief demandeur of every major international 
environmental agreement since the early 1990s. Nor can functional considerations 
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regulatory practices – such as the ‘precautionary principle’. 
  Moving beyond purely functionalist explanations, there is an established 
literature in political science and sociology examining sources of state support for 
MEAs. However, the leading arguments in this literature do not offer adequate 
explanations for the emergence of EU leadership.  One line of argument suggests that 
increases in wealth encourage the spread of post-materialist values that inspire greater 
public support for environmental protection.  As this support is channelled through 
the political process, it translates into a greater propensity of states to sign and ratify 
international environmental treaties. A variety of large-N studies do demonstrate 
positive correlations between wealth and post-materialist values and the ratification of 
MEAs (Roberts et al. 2004, Recchia 2002, Scruggs 2003: 83-106).  However, 
arguments based on these factors are designed to predict a state’s propensity to sign 
environmental treaties, not their willingness to play a leadership role.  If one stretches 
these explanations in an effort to explain leadership, they would seem to suggest that 
the US – not the EU - should have remained the environmental leader in the 1990s. 
Trends in economic growth and post-materialist values in the 1980s and 1990s – 
when the US made greater gains in both areas than the EU -  would not lead one to 
expect that the EU would assume the mantle of global environmental leadership in the 
1990s (Scruggs 2003:106; Kelemen and Vogel, forthcoming). 
Scholars working in the social constructivist tradition have argued that a 
state’s support for international environmental treaties is not determined by domestic 
interests, but rather is ‘constructed’ by a ‘world environmental regime’ (Meyer, et al.: 
1997) that informs and structures national preferences.  States internalize a form of 
peer pressure, and seek to ‘enact’ behaviors expected of modern states, including the 
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the states most deeply embedded in world society tend to ratify more environmental 
treaties (Frank 1999:534).  Whatever the merits of this perspective, it cannot by itself 
explain EU leadership, because a host of other advanced industrialized democracies 
such as Japan, the US, Australia and Canada are embedded in world society to a 
similar degree as the EU, but none of them has asserted a role of global environmental 
leader on par with the EU. 
  The literature on EU foreign policy offers a more plausible set of arguments.  
This literature suggests that the EU has asserted leadership on questions of global 
environmental governance in an effort to carve out an identity and a profile for itself 
as a ‘normative’ or ‘civilian’ power on the world stage.  Since the 1970s, scholars 
have argued that in light of the EU’s limited military capacity and the intractable 
divisions between member states on security issues, the EU has focused on asserting 
itself as a ‘civilian power’ in areas such as trade and human rights where it did have 
some capacity to act (Duchêne 1972, Zielonka 1998, Hettne and Söderbaum 2005).  
Similarly, Manners (2002) has argued that the EU is distinguishing itself as a 
‘normative power’ on the international stage, in that it acts to diffuse a series of norms 
around the world, such as democracy, human rights, and sustainable development.  
Others have specifically applied this perspective to explain EU leadership on global 
environmental governance (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Vogler and Stephan 2007).   
  It is clear that the EU has tried to develop a profile as a civilian or normative 
power on the world stage, promoting multilateral measures designed to safeguard a 
variety of norms – including environmental norms (Farrell 2007; Hettne and 
Söderbaum 2005; Vogler and Stephan 2007).  Between the 1970s and 1990s, a series 
of Treaty amendments, directives and ECJ decisions gave the EU the power to act on 
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possible for the EU to play global leadership role.  The EU quickly put this power to 
use staking out a leadership role at the 1992 Rio Summit, and since then the EU has 
consistently championed MEAs (Vogler and Stephan 2007, p. 394-396).  In 2000 
Commission President Romano Prodi summarized these ambitions, explaining, “We 
must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global 
development” (Prodi 2000, p. 3).  
  This literature suggests a variety of reasons why the EU has made such a 
priority of spreading its environmental norms.  Manners argues that the EU’s 
promotes norms such as sustainable development in order to legitimate itself with 
sceptical EU citizens (2002, p.244). Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) suggest that the 
EU has focused on environmental issues such as climate change in order to develop 
its identity in contrast to ‘the other’ of the US.  Vogler and Stephan (2007) suggest 
that the EU’s general commitment to multilateralism has been central in explaining its 
consistent support for MEAs.  While the precise causal arguments vary, it does seem 
likely that the EU’s desire to establish an identity and a reputation as a ‘normative 
power’ encouraged EU leadership on global environmental issues. 
  However, these arguments are notably silent on the question of whether, and if 
so how, global environmental leadership may have served the material interests of the 
EU.  Were these normative commitments necessary or sufficient conditions for the 
emergence of EU leadership? Would normative commitments alone have led the EU 
to take on a leadership role if doing so would have damaged the economic interests of 
the EU?  By contrast, is it possible that economic interests provided the primary 
motivation for the EU taking on a leadership role, while normative commitments 
played a secondary, complementary role?  
  8This article offers a political-economy based explanation for the emergence of 
EU leadership in international environmental politics. While acknowledging that 
normative commitments and the desire to develop a reputation as a civilian power 
played an important complementary role, I argue that the interaction of developments 
in domestic politics and international regulatory competition provides a more 
powerful explanation for the emergence of EU environmental leadership. 
  The regulatory politics perspective (Kelemen and Vogel, forthcoming) fuses 
domestic politics with international regulatory competition.  The ultimate source of a 
polity’s position on international environmental issues can be traced to the strength of 
environmental constituencies within the political system.  The stronger the domestic 
political influence of environmentalists, the more stringent domestic standards are 
likely to be and the stronger the political commitment to maintaining those standards 
in the face of globalization pressures is likely to be.  The existence of these strict and 
entrenched domestic standards in turn makes it more likely that domestic producers 
will support international treaties that impose similar standards on foreign 
competitors.  Where industry sees that, due to the influence of environmental 
interests, it will be forced to bear the costs of strict environmental regulations, then it 
will support (or at least not oppose) efforts to spread those standards to other 
jurisdictions – sometimes joining them in ‘Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions’ (Vogel 
1995, Desombre 2000, Young 2003). As we will see in the next section, this 
perspective fits well with the empirical record in the EU, explaining both the general 
shift toward a leadership position from the early 1990s and the specific positions 
taken by the EU on a number of important international environmental issues. Instead 
of allowing globalization pressures to dictate the terms of its environmental policy, 
the EU has deployed strategies designed to spread its standards to other jurisdictions.  
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II. The political economy of EU global environmental leadership 
The roots of the EU’s transformation into the global leader in international 
environmental politics can be traced to major shifts in domestic environmental 
politics in Europe beginning in the 1980s.  Mass environmental movements had 
emerged across western Europe in the 1970s, and governments had responded by 
establishing new pollution control laws.  However, environmentalists in Europe never 
achieved the prominence or power of their US counterparts, and national 
environmental laws adopted in Europe in this period were generally less stringent than 
those established in the US (Vogel 2003). The salience of environmental issues – and 
the political influence of pro-environment forces - declined in the late 1970s in the 
wake of the oil shocks.  However, in the 1980s, a series of highly publicized 
environmental calamities, including the ‘forest death’ (Waldsterben) caused by acid 
rain in the early 1980s, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the discovery of the 
‘hole’ in the Ozone layer in the mid-1980s, all heightened the political salience of 
environmental issues across Europe.  These issues, along with scandals concerning 
cross-border toxic waste shipments in Europe (Kelemen 2004, p. 32), also underlined 
the increasingly transboundary implications of environmental issues.  By the late 
1980s, Eurobarometer surveys found environment problems to be one of the chief 
political concerns in all member states (Hofrichter and Reif 1990). Governments in a 
number of Member States responded to this public concern by supporting strict new 
domestic standards and enhanced their commitments to international environmental 
cooperation. 
The sensitivity of national governments to these shifts in public opinion was 
heightened by the emergence of Green parties. Given the opportunities for the 
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those that use proportional representation), environmental activists in Europe became 
involved in electoral politics in the 1980s. First in Germany in 1983, and later in a 
number of countries including Sweden, France and Belgium, significant Green parties 
raised the profile of environmental issues in national political debates (Mair 2001). By 
the end of the 1990s, Green parties were represented in eleven of fifteen national 
parliaments in the EU and in the European Parliament (EP) (Vogel 2003).  These 
parties moved increasingly from the fringe to the mainstream of party politics during 
the 1990s and entered national coalition governments along with social democrats in 
some member states, most prominently Germany.   
  The power of environmentalists at the national level was magnified by the 
dynamics of environmental policy-making at the EU level.  First, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament had strong incentives to see the EU take on 
a powerful role in environmental policy and to adopt strict standards.  National 
environmental regulations adopted in the 1970s and 1980s threatened to create ‘non-
tariff barriers’ that would impede trade and undermine the progress the EU had made 
toward completing the internal market.  With many on the political left arguing at the 
time that the EU merely served the interests of international business, attacking 
national environmental standards as non-tariff barriers would have been politically 
disastrous for the EU. Instead, the EU sought to protect the single market by 
harmonizing environmental standards at high levels of protection.  This approach 
appealed to the European Commission and the EP because they saw that championing 
a strong environmental policy would increase the EU’s popularity and legitimacy in 
the eyes of European citizens, demonstrating that the EU did not simply serve 
business interests but public interests as well.  In particular, the EP, whose policy-
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champion environmental protection (Pollack 1997).  The Commission and Parliament 
found strong supporters among the greenest member states (the Netherlands, 
Denmark and, above all, Germany), who viewed the EU as a forum through which 
they could export their strict standards to laggard Member States (Kelemen 2004; 
Vogel 2003).  ECJ jurisprudence from 1991 onward and Treaty revisions made at 
Maastricht shifted the decision-making rule for environmental measures from 
unanimity to qualified majority voting, helping the powerful green states to overcome 
opposition from laggards (Kelemen 2004, pp.28-31).  After the accession of Sweden, 
Austria and Finland in 1995, the bloc of pro-environment states grew even stronger. 
Finally, the fact that environment ministers representing their states in the EU’s 
Council of Ministers deliberate amongst themselves – insulated from the critical eyes 
of ministers of economics and industry – has emboldened them to agree on more 
ambitious policies (Sbragia 2000). 
The combination of the domestic political power of environmentalists and the 
dynamics of EU policy-making explains why the EU and its member states pursued 
increasingly stringent and ambitious environmental policies in the 1990s.  The policy 
victories won by environmentalists in Europe unleashed a regulatory competition 
dynamic.  Faced with stringent environmental standards within the EU, European 
firms and member state governments had strong incentives to see EU standards spread 
internationally, so that foreign competitors would have to meet similar regulatory 
burdens.  Meanwhile, the EU’s capacity to act in a coherent fashion to spread its 
standards internationally was increasing.   This capacity developed gradually, through 
the extension of the EU’s environmental competence and its role in external policies, 
and through the increasing recognition afforded to the EU in international fora (Jupille 
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2  These developments 
culminated in the run-up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio where the EU was allowed to join as an equal participant and 
Commission President Jacques Delors was given a status equivalent to head of state 
(Vogler and Stephan 2007; Sbragia and Damro 1999). 
So, by the early 1990s, the EU had strong incentives to try to export its 
environmental standards and an increasing capacity to do so.  The EU deployed the 
strategies of ‘exercising regulatory influence’ and ‘empowering international 
institutions’ to manage globalization and to spread its environmental standards to 
other jurisdictions. Developments in the fields of GMO regulation, the fight against 
climate change and in the broader question of ‘greening’ the world trade regime 
illustrate these dynamics.  
 
GMOs 
In the 1990s, in response to mounting health, consumer safety and environmental 
concerns in Europe, the EU has established the most stringent regulatory regime for 
the authorization and labelling of GMOs in the world (Pollack and Shaffer 2005, 
Bernauer 2003).  The EU adopted its first common legislation on GMOs in 1990 
(Directive 90/220/EEC). Though public opinion on GMOs and initial policy reactions 
varied greatly among EU member states (Kurzer and Cooper 2007), states hostile to 
GMOs were able to dominate at the EU level and to force a de facto moratorium on 
new GM products in Europe from 1998. The EU introduced new common rules 
governing the experimental release, marketing, labelling and tracing of GMOs 
between 2001 and 2003 (Directive 2001/18/EC, Regulation 1830/2003/EC and 
Regulation 1829/2003/EC).  The EU’s approach to the regulation of GMOs was 
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to restrict products that pose potential risks even where scientific uncertainty makes it 
impossible to assess the risk conclusively. 
  From the outset, the EU’s regulatory regime for GMOs was confronted with 
‘globalization pressures’ in the form of potential legal attacks before the WTO.  The 
US, which took a far more lax approach to GMO regulation and was home to major 
producers and exporters of GMOs, viewed EU GMO regulations as an unjustified 
trade barrier (Vogel 2003, Young 2003, Bernauer 2003). When the EU tightened its 
restrictions on GMOs in 1998, the US threatened to take legal action before the WTO. 
  As popular backlash against ‘Frankenstein foods’ mounted in some member 
states, any possibility of resolving the dispute simply through opening the European 
market to GMOs became a political non-starter – even though this would have been 
the preferred solution of many in the European Commission (Young 2003).  The EU 
responded by leading a drive to ‘internationalize’ its approach to GMO regulation 
through a protocol to the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity.  The EU succeeded in 
spearheading the creation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000 (Depledge 
2000).  The Cartagena Protocol adopted the EU’s ‘precautionary principle’ as a 
potential justification for trade restrictions on genetically modified seeds and crops: in 
other words, by embracing the precautionary principle, Cartagena made it easier for 
countries to block imports of GMOs. Because of long-standing regulatory restrictions 
within the EU and consumer resistance to genetically modified foodstuffs, few 
European firms produced such genetically modified seeds or foodstuffs and few 
farmers grew them.  As a result, these European commercial interests had little to lose 
from a Treaty like the Cartagena protocol that would restrict trade in GMOs.  They 
did, however, stand to benefit if such restrictions raised costs or reduced demand for 
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the international level, the EU also significantly enhanced the legitimacy of the 
‘precautionary principle’ and increased the chance that EU rules might withstand 
scrutiny before the WTO. A domestic standard, like the precautionary principle, can 
hardly be treated as arbitrary or a completely unjustifiable trade barrier once it is 
enshrined in an international treaty signed by dozens of states. 
  Ultimately, the EU was at best partially successful.  In 2003, the US, together 
with Canada and Argentina, brought a WTO action charging that the EU’s de facto 
moratorium on GMOs between 1999 and 2003 violated world trade rules.  In 2004, 
the EU lifted its moratorium, put in place a new system for the evaluation and 
authorisation of GMO products, and began to approve a handful of genetically 
modified foodstuffs (principally grains for animal feed). The WTO finally issued a 
ruling in February 2006, declaring that the EU’s moratorium between 1999 and 2003 
had been illegal.  The EU accepted the ruling, but emphasized that the ruling did not 
invalidate the new system of GMO regulation it had put in place in 2004, which was 
based on scientific evaluation of GMOs, but still applied the precautionary principle 
(Alden and Grant 2006).  The EU’s strategy of shielding its own GMO policies by 
promoting the spread of the precautionary principle in the Cartagena Protocol had not 
prevented the US - which had refused to sign on to the Cartagena Protocol – from 
attacking it.  However, it is likely that the existence of the Cartagena Protocol, 
endorsed by more than 130 countries, made the WTO panel less willing than it might 
otherwise have been to undertake a frontal assault on the new EU regulatory regime 
and the precautionary principle that underpins it. 
 
Climate change 
  15As in the case of GMOs, the interaction of domestic politics and regulatory 
competition also encouraged the EU to take on a leadership role in addressing climate 
change.  As awareness of the threat posed by climate change increased in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, domestic political pressure for action to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions mounted in Europe.  National governments in the greenest member states 
acted first, with the Dutch, German and Danish governments making commitments to 
CO2 reductions in 1989 and 1990 (Porter and Brown 1991, p. 95). Quickly, the EU 
stepped in to develop a common approach, and the Council of Ministers announced 
that the EU as a whole, working through a ‘burden-sharing’ or ‘bubble’ approach, 
would seek to stabilize its CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.  With this approach 
national commitments within the EU would be differentiated with some member 
states (principally the most economically developed ones) making the substantial 
reductions, and others (principally the less developed EU members) actually being 
permitted to increase emissions. 
Turning to the international arena, the calculus for European policy-makers 
was clear: the bold, costly domestic actions on climate change that European publics 
demanded would put European industry at a competitive disadvantage unless an 
international agreement was reached that would force the EU’s competitors to 
undertake costly measures as well.  After proposing that the EU introduce a carbon 
tax in order to achieve the target for CO2 emissions reductions that it had set for itself 
in 1990, and the Commission pushed for industrialized nations to adopt similar energy 
taxes in the run-up to Rio.  After other states refused to do so at the Rio Earth 
Summit, the Commission abandoned its carbon tax proposal in 1992. 
The EU assumed an even more pronounced leadership role in the negotiations over 
the Kyoto Protocol between 1995 and 1997.  In the negotiations leading to Kyoto, it 
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committed to do so regardless of the outcome of Kyoto. It was also clear, from early 
in the negotiating process, that the costs of implementing Kyoto promised to be 
substantially less for the EU than for some other industrialized states – above all the 
US.  One crucial factor was that 1990 was to be used as the base-line year against 
which mandatory reductions (of 8% for the EU and 7% for the US) would measured.    
Using 1990 as a baseline allowed the EU to take advantage of reductions in emissions 
that were occurring in any case for idiosyncratic reasons - the switch from reliance on 
coal to natural gas in the UK in the first half of the 1990s and the shuttering of 
polluting industries in former East Germany after reunification which had led to 
massive reductions in CO2 emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007).  As the EU 
was allowed to use a differentiated ‘bubble’ or burden sharing approach, the large 
‘exogenous’ reductions occurring in Germany and the UK could be leveraged to eas 
the emissions reduction burden for other member states. Finally, the 1990 baseline 
had an other advantage for the EU in that the European economy – and associated 
CO2 emissions - had grown far more slowly in the 1990s than the US economy and 
US emissions. Therefore, by the time the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, the US 
would have had to cut its projected emissions by 30-35% to meet Kyoto’s 2012 target, 
where the EU would have only had to make cuts of 15-20%.
3  Indeed, some observers 
have argued that the EU hoped to use climate change negotiations to pressure the US 
to raise its relatively low energy taxes and thus to create a more level competitive 
playing field (Yandle and Buck 2002:197).   The point here is not to suggest that the 
EU asserted leadership on Kyoto simply in an effort to raise costs for competitors. 
The point, rather, is that because the EU was going to take substantial, highly costly 
action on greenhouse gas emissions in any case due to domestica political pressure, 
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industrialized states - to join them in the fight against climate change. 
Despite the EU’s inability to secure US participation in the agreement, EU 
leadership on Kyoto should be viewed as a relatively successful case of managing 
globalization.  Kyoto has 178 signatories, and the EU has played a pivotal role in 
persuading key hold-out states such as Russia to participate.  Moreover, the EU has 
been able to use the framework provided by Kyoto and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) – with tools such as ‘Clean Development 
Mechanism’ (CDM) – projects to encourage developing countries to join the effort to 
combat climate change and to encourage them to adopt EU standards and 
technologies when doing so.  For instance, within the UNFCC/Kyoto framework, the 
EU has worked closely with China, establishing the EU-China Partnership on Climate 
Change in 2005, which promotes the transfer of low carbon technologies and CDM 
projects involving European and Chinese partners. 
Turning to the ongoing negotiations on a post-Kyoto framework for combating 
climate change, we can observe similar dynamics behind EU leadership.  In 2007, 
when the European Commission announced new plans to combat climate change, 
Commission Preident Barroso acknowledged that the new rules would raise 
production costs and damage the competitiveness of EU industries.  Therefore, the 
Commission proposed imposing a carbon tax on imports from countries that do not 
maintain similar restrictions on carbon emissions.  French President Sarkozy 
expressed strong support for carbon tariffs, as did a number of members of the 
European Parliament and environmentalists.  The fate of such proposals remains 
uncertain, but it is clear that many EU leaders are hoping to use the threat of ‘carbon 
tariffs as a way to pressure reluctant developed states – such as the US – and 
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framework.  Having established its bona fides as an environmental leader in the 
earlier rounds of climate negotiations – and in negotiations on other environmental 
issues – it seems that the EU will now likely to rely more heavily on leveraging its 
market power to press other states to join it in making substantial commitments to 
reducing emissions. 
 
Greening World Trade 
The EU has attempted to manage the impact of globalization on environmental 
regulation through two principal strategies.  First and foremost, the EU tried to 
‘globalize’ the environmental standards it favors through MEAs, as illustrated above 
in the discussions of the Cartagena Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU’s 
second strategy has been its broader effort to ‘green’ the international trade regime.  
The EU has pressed for changes to or interpretations of international trade rules (i.e. 
those of the WTO) that would allow them to accommodate EU environmental 
measures and commitments made by the EU under MEAs.  Conflicts between free 
trade rules and EU environmental policy commitments have led the EU to a number 
of ‘trade vs. environment’ disputes before the WTO, including the Hormone Treated 
Beef and GMO disputes.  The EU has defended itself vigorously in these cases, but 
the EU has also gone on the offense, attempting to manage globalization by greening 
global trade rules before it is forced to defend itself in a judicial setting. 
  The GATT’s Article XX ‘general exceptions’ clause provides for exceptions 
to its free trade obligations that enable signatories to restrict trade on environmental 
grounds.  During the Uruguay Round, the US and EU demanded the additional 
agreements that would clarify their right to maintain domestic environmental rules.  
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Barriers to Trade (TBT) concluded during the Uruguay round elaborated these 
conditions (Steinberg 1997). 
  Beginning in the mid-1990s, the EU raised particular concerns regarding the 
relationship between trade obligations contained in MEAs and general free trade rules 
of the GATT/WTO.  The problem that they highlighted was that MEAs contain 
various trade measures including, trade bans, export and import licensing procedures 
and notification, packaging and labelling requirements.  For instance, the Convention 
on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) restricts trade in endangered animal species, 
and the Montreal Protocol bans the import of CFCs from non-parties. The EU was 
concerned with how the WTO would resolve disputes between free trade 
requirements and trade restrictions called for in international environmental treaties. 
  In the Doha Round trade negotiations, the EU has taken a lead role in pushing 
for reforms to the GATT that would give trade measures contained in MEAs 
supremacy over WTO requirements in cases of conflict.  The EU began promoting 
this position prior to Doha, when, in 1996, it pressed the WTO’s Committee on Trade 
and the Environment to add a reference to MEA trade provisions and other “measures 
necessary to protect the environment” to GATT’s Article XX exceptions (Stoler 2004; 
See also Steinberg 1997).  In recent negotiations, the EU has retreated somewhat, but 
still calls for MEAs and the WTO to be treated as equal bodies of international law 
and for the WTO to defer to MEAs on environmentally related trade restrictions. 
  Taking a step back, we can see how the EU’s drive to make trade restrictions 
required by MEA’s effectively ‘WTO-proof’, meshes with its consistent leadership on 
MEAs.  The EU recognizes that standing in isolation, many of its environmental 
policies – particularly those based on the precautionary principle – may not withstand 
  20scrutiny with the WTO.  However, where the EU can internationalise its standards by 
convincing other countries to sign on to them in an MEA, then these standards gain 
international legitimacy and may withstand legal challenges at the WTO. 
 
Conclusions 
To be sure, many factors have contributed to the rise of the EU as the undisputed 
leader in global environmental governance.  A series of legal and political reforms 
and the EU’s broad commitment to developing common foreign economic policy 
increased the EU’s capacity to act in a cohesive fashion in the environmental arena.  
Global environmental problems, by their very nature, call for multilateral solutions.  
Thus, the environment was a natural focus for the many EU leaders committed to the 
EU developing an identity as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power on the world stage.  
The US retreat from leadership made this more attractive, in that the EU could 
contrast its virtuous, environmental leadership with the US’ rogue behaviour.  While 
these factors certainly played a role, the roots of the EU’s commitment to global 
environmental leadership can be found at the intersection of domestic politics and 
international political economy.  In the 1990s, the dramatic increase in power of 
environmental interests across Europe, and the dynamics of EU policy-making which 
encouraged harmonization at high levels of environmental protection led the EU to 
adopt the strictest, most ambitious environmental legislation in the world.  Given that 
strict standards were being put in place across Europe, it was in the interests of 
European industry and European governments to see similar standards spread to other 
jurisdictions. 
The role of the EU in championing MEAs is well illustrated above in the 
discussions of the Cartagena Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol.  The most striking 
  21aspect of the EU’s position on MEAs is the sheer consistency with which it has 
supported them in recent years.  The EU has emerged as a leading supporter of every 
major international environmental treaty since 1989. By consistently positioning itself 
as an environmental leader, the EU has spread a number of its environmental 
standards to other jurisdictions and has built up a reservoir of credibility in this policy 
domain, which it may draw on in defending new measures against accusations that 
they constitute veiled protectionism.  The EU has also worked to ‘green’ the world 
trade regime, elevating the status of MEAs vis-à-vis WTO rules.  In all of this, the EU 
has not idly waited for the pressures of globalization to undermine its commitment to 
environmental policy.  Instead, the EU has taken a leadership role and gone on the 
offensive to manage globalization or - to paraphrase Woodrow Wilson in a very 
different context – to make the world safe for environmental policy. 
These dynamics clearly extend beyond the specific cases discussed above and 
can be observed in other areas of environmental, consumer protection and economic 
regulation.  For instance, as the EU developed its ambitious new regulatory regime for 
chemicals (REACH), it simultaneously sought to influence international debates 
concerning chemicals regulation (Fisher 2008, Pesendorfer 2006).  In attempting to 
spread its strict chemical safety standards, the EU is both leveraging its market power 
by requiring all foreign manufacturers exporting to the European market to comply 
with REACH and is supporting strengthening international initiatives on chemicals 
regulation – above all the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants.  Moving beyond the environmental field, in areas including data privacy 
regulation, securities regulation, telecoms regulation, accounting standards and 
pharmaceutical standards, we can observe similar processes at work with the EU 
harnessing its market power and multilateral agreements to ‘globalize’ its standards 
  22(Bach and Newman 2007; Glimstedt 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Shaffer 2002; 
Mitchener 2002). 
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